Is that really the Quote? I swear I saw that in Ambrose this time but I can’t imagine HK uttering a phrase he would know to be so closely associated with appeasement and Chamberlain and WWII. Maybe it was some kind of code.
But her he is, a “brilliant”, “megalomaniac”, whose self-confidence knew no bounds. What else can you make of A&B’s assessment of HK? Was he a war criminal?
Was he just a doddering old man?
and how was his, and Nixon’s, foreign policy?
I thought it was kind of funny that Ambrose was talking crap about Kissinger. I mean, after all we’ve read by Kissinger, I have come to like him and his funny little personal stories. I was taken aback when I read Ambrose’s assessment of Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy. According to Kissinger, “through linkage, Kissinger would out Metternich Metternich” (229). In response to your question, no I do not think Kissinger was a war criminal but he was somewhat responsible for all those deaths in Vietnam. I cannot evaluate until I get Kissingers side of the story. I am excited to see how Kissinger evaluates his own policy of linkage.
In Ambrose’s opinion, there were many shades of meaning when it came down to Nixon’s policym, however the purpose was always clear and concise. His aim was to “get Moscow and Peking to force Hanoi to allow the United States to extract itself from South Vietnam and to refrain from toppling Thieu until a “decent interval had gone by” (233-234)”. Ambrose also states that linkage had several success in parts of Asia and Europe. “Japan got what they wanted in the Pacific, Communists got what they wanted from East Berlin, East Germany and East Europe” (235).
While reading this chapter, I came across something very interesting towards the end of the reading, where A&B said that when the government finally ordered the evacuation of American troops from Vietnam, the US Marines had to prevent some Vietnamese (primarily those who had helped them all throughout the war) from boarding the evacuation planes headed to America. This just seemed so awful, that after the Vietnamese had essentially turned against their own people, they were still denied help and an escape to safety. Although A&B mentioned that a select few Vietnamese were brought back, that by no means justifies the countless individuals who were left behind.
I thought it was very interesting the comment Ambrose makes about halfway through the chapter when he says “Congress was frustrated by the way, but it hardly knew what to do about it”. Vietnam was an undeclared war, yet Americans were confused as to why we still stayed and fought. Part of the frustration can be pinned on the lack of substantial information given to the public. Congress and America were blindly following the President who in turn looked to his advisors; part of the problem of the war was blamed on Kissinger. I believe that it remains to be seen whether or not Ambrose’s allegations bear weight, but they have a large significance. These claims seve the purpose of demonstrating the massive divides and confusion within America that may have led to our prolonged involvement in the country.
One thing that I found interesting about this chapter was Ambrose’s comment that Kissinger out-Metterniched Metternich. Maybe this is why Kissinger loves Metternich so much; he seems to have used Metternich as a role model. As for Kissinger’s foreign policy, I think that it would be quite a stretch to call him a war criminal. The American withdrawl from Vietnam was going to be difficult, regardless of what the US did. Kissinger’s attempts at Vietnamization were a tough choice that resulted in the deaths of many Vietnamese people, but can he really be blamed for withdrawing US troops from a war that few people wanted?