The uprising photographed above is not Hungary, but Berlin, 1953, reduced to a parenthetical reference in this chapter. Berlin in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956 – what was happening?
In Berlin new policies were being implemented driving prices up, taxes up, quotas up and leaving pay the same, or even reduced if quotas not met. A mass exodus of the professionals to the west (pre-wall remember) was taking place but the policies also led to a massive worker uprising / strike which was crushed under the treads of Soviet tanks. The number killed, wounded and arrested remains difficult to say but we can say that there certainly were many.
Remember the little talk we had about diplomacy and language the other day? When Khrushchev goes to Poland this is the reason he is not recieved by the official party. When Eisenhower goes on the air to discuss world developments in Suez, diplomacy is the reason (though maybe mistakenly according to my read of Kissinger) that he says nothing of consequence about events in Hungary.
Remember the last elections in Iran? People in the Iranian government said, and probably still say that all the agitation was caused by the west (by the US). Obama was very careful in his language to try to show that the US was entirely hands off in the actions of the Iranian people and I think similarly here Eisenhower did not want there to be any semblence of a possibility that someone would believe the Hungarians were being aided by the US lest there be a discrediting of the movement and an excuse for the Soviets to treat the uprising as an international provocation. Of course it turns out the Soviets needed no such excuse.
It is interesting to note as well that Kissinger points out from the days of the Tsar, to the Soviets to the post Cold-War world Russians have treated bordering states similarly, or at least tried to. He was writing 15 years ago before the events in Chechnya.
So why did things go differently in Poland than in Hungary? Why did Soviet tanks turn around in Poland and why were leaders executed in Hungary? How might Eisenhower or the UN played things differently here? Please remember all of this when we get to “Prague Spring” of 1968 and the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980.
CRS
During 1956, Kissinger says “there was a bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising” (550). While in Poland there were riots that resulted in numerous deaths. During this time, Kissinger reports,”Gomulka, purged and disgraced in 1951, was asked to return as first Secretary of the Communist Party, attending his first Politburo meeting on October 13, 1956″ (554).
According to Kissinger, the Kremlin were considering the idea of intervening in Poland, but “Instead, the Soviet delegation was asked to repair to the Belvedere Palace, which was reserved for state guests” (554). What is stated in the chapter, that might have been the cause of the Soviet tanks turning around, was that Gomulka promised that they would keep the socialist system and continue Poland’s membership in the Warsaw Pact.
Kissinger explains that Hungary took on much more violence because unlike Poland they wanted to seek the complete destruction of communism . Nagy was stuck between the people and his communist allies. The Soviet Union had been even more harsh that its imperial days.
In the blog you mention how the Soviet Union needed no such provovations to blame the US for eastern European uprisings, but while reading the chapter, I came across a statement made by Kissinger that says “Moscow was never warned that the threat or the use of force would jeopardize its relations with Washington” (557), in reference to the rebellions happening in Hungary. Students were openly opposing the government, which led to countless bloody battles in the streets, meanwhile the US did nothing. In some instances, Kissinger talks about how the US should have gotten involved, mostly in reference to Dulles who strongly discouraged the practice of containment. At the same time, Kissinger often said that the US didn’t need to busy themselves with an overseas war that would only put them in a bad situation with the Soviet Union. I’m not sure what the “right” answer would have been, but it seems that no matter what would have happened, the United States and the USSR would have blamed eachother.
I think much of the difference between the events in Poland and Hungary had to do with the populations of said countries. Poland had a much larger population, and a much more ouvert opposition to soviet control. That said, I think that the Soviet Union was playing it safe by backing down in Poland. While reading the chapter, I kept thinking to myself that Dulles and Eisenhower had it all wrong when they were making their statements about Hungary. Of course, they were being cautious at the time, and we know more now than they did then, but their continued misinterpretation of Soviet intentions is agonizing to read about. It makes me wonder what the outcome would have been had Kissinger been in control at the time.
I find it sad that so many lives had to be lost in the crossfire between Soviet and American politics. The biggest problem I see with the way the world is being run during this phase of the Cold War is the policy of morality by the United States (whether a facade or not), when we involve ourselves in the affairs of others because either no other country can, or wants to. We’re trying to run the country based on moral principles that not many other countries keep or care about (lost to bigger domestic problems or territorial disputes etc.)
The misconceptions of American motives is what led to the heavy Soviet involvement in Hungary. We promised economic aid to countries defecting from the Warsaw pact out of the policy of freedom (with a catch of being friendly to the US of course) thought the Soviets believed it to lead to a perpetuation of capital influences in Eastern Europe. When Dulles and Eisenhower promised to not use force out of some sort of promise of peace and good faith, the Soviets ended up acting without consequences. I wonder then is we would have reversed our policies, to let the Soviets have control of their own spheres of influence but to keep up the threat of intervention if things got out of hand, would things have turned out differently?
I’m not sure whether this is opinion or fact, but in this chapter Kissinger makes the claim that the Soviet Union backs down from Poland because they could not deal with the strength of the country. Kissinger says that “repression would have meant coping with a population over 30 million whose proven courage [...] was magnified by memories of historic Russian oppression.” In other words, Poland had had enought of Russia and their anger made them a risk. At the same time, the kremlin saw Hungary as a bigger threat to the security of communism. Hungary had a smaller population and had been weakened by Rákosi for generations. So overall, I understand why the Soviet Union left Poland alone and turned its tanks towards Hungary; they wanted to win a battle and they did.
For me, this chapter was short and sweet, but not its contents. I found it very upsetting that the Hungarian government was treated that way not by the Soviet, but the United Nations. I believe that the Hungarian people may be asking for more than the Soviet Union can handle (because the Kremlin was scared of losing countries in the Warsaw Pact and losing the whole communist edifice overall), so in their view, I find the Soviet’s actions true to their fears (that still does not mean that I agree with their savage actions). However, I feel that the U.S. and the West could have done more about this Hungarian question. I felt especially frustrated when I read the short lines “[Nagy] never received a reply [from the U.N.]” and “the Hungarian resolution was ignored.” I thought it was really unfair that the U.S. would make statements that sound like they were going to go out and “liberate” nations but did not follow through.
In one aspect, I think that Kissinger is more critical of the Eisenhower Admin’s actions than Ambrose. He pointed out several times (some repeatedly) that Eisenhower Admin and the West could have done more with the situation, even if it does not mean using force. Ambrose simply concentrated on how Eisenhower seemed like a hero because he saved the U.S. and possibly the world from a WWIII. I thought the two views have stable support of their claims, but I feel like the U.S. still did not complete its life-long mission of being a democracy-advocate and the role of a “crusader.” Like Kissinger, I believe that Eisenhower should have made a clearer and firmer stand of the U.S. to the Soviet Union. I don’t think standing silently beside the crisis was a wise move of the U.S.