So what was MASH about? There was a movie that was good, with Elliot Gould, but then the TV show was simply great. It was about Korea, nominally, but it was also very much about Vietnam and the futility of war. Kissinger is doing something similar here. He’s writing about Korea, but he’s saying a lot about Vietnam.
He brings up Saddam Hussein of course and this is a reference to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, wherein the US “kicked the Vietnam Syndrome” according to President GHW Bush, and Kissinger is comparing N. Korea and Iraq’s suprise at the US reaction. Neither believed the US would act if they invaded.
They shouldn’t have been suprised though. In 1946 Truman wrote a letter we saw in the documents asserting we needed to make a strong government in Korea. Though in 1950 American planners (like German and Russian planners we saw earlier) were only really planning on the possibility of a general war and a general war in Europe no less. That they were able to keep Korea from going general was of course a great thing. Despite claims that our line of defense did not include the Korean peninsula (look at a map) that was only in relation to a general war, but in this now limitited war, the US and the UN would and do respond.
The struggle between Truman and MacArthur, China and Taiwan, N Korea and Stalin and the USSR all bear some consideration. Any reference to Indochina/Vietnam should also be noted. You also know, that N Korea, like Cuba, remain isolated states today, perfect examples of the policy of containment.
There never was a peace signed in Korea. Its still a hostile border. Looking back at my blog from last year I was pointing to the then current event of N Korea shelling S Korea and killing four persons. That the study of history is very much the study of today has rarely been clearer.
The war in Korea was very critical, it was basically the hidden truth war. Reason being, Truman’s leadership was finally tested to the extreme, MacArtur’s actions were viewed as very military based, the Soviet Union were feared but where never going to test America, and America feared a possible WWIII. It’s incredible to see that 150,000 of our men were lost in such a short period, we weren’t even trying to fight, at most times we just tried to avoid any conflict, but when we fought against aggression our public believed we were fighting against “bad”. China, right after civil war and WWII, decided to defend against American trespassing beyond the 38th parallel.
Henry Kissinger states that Truman’s choices would be : status quo, all out war, or allow the military to push were it can. Truman was indeed looked at oddly for changing our protection box to expand to include Korea, it’s odd because of its distance from Europe.
Essentially the war in Korea helped to fight Communism but lead much fear against the Soviet Union and China.
I definitely drew the connection between Korea and Vietnam. What resonated with me the most is when Kissinger notes the opinions of critics during both wars. Korean critics sought victory while critics of Vietnam completely deterred from that and actualll encouraged defeat. I think that both wars share important similarities. Most notabably the negative perception of the war in the American public. America was outraged at the duration of the Korean War and that it reached at stalemate. I’m not exactly sure about Vietnam but I know that the soldiers didn’t receive an honorable welcome home, mass demonstrations that protested the war were common, etc. Containing Communism in Asia was definitelt y more troublesome than in Europe.
I found it interesting that the Korean war became just because of misunderstandings between what USSR and US thought the others ideas were. The USSR thought that US didnt care about Korea, and were not trying to cause problems, and they were right that the US didnt really care. However, they got unlucky because the US saw it as a challenge, when really the USSR was just picking up what they believed the US was giving them. As Kissinger puts it, a “double misunderstanding”.
I also really liked Kissingers line “America thus found itself in a limited war for which it had no doctrine and in defense of a distant country in which it had declared it had no strategic interest.” It makes it seem like America really didnt belong in the war, but because of the containment policy they were forced to enter
I have knowledge that there was a war in Korea that the United States was involved in and that the Soviets were somewhere in the mix but i havent had anymore knowledge than that on the Korean war, it has been something that i have never really been taught or have seen on the History channel. Its usually WWII or Vietnam but never anything on Korea. I found it pretty interesting how the whole thing was just a huge misunderstanding. Like the US saying, that they dont really care about what happens in Korea but when the Soviets go to move in the US goes to try and stop them from trying to take over.
I noticed that Kissinger was bagging a lot on Truman’s administration throughout the chapter. He kept bringing up the fact that the Soviet Union didn’t want war, and knew they wouldn’t be able to win one, yet the United States were frightened that if they were able to get the communists out of Korea, the Soviet Union would come after them. Kissinger is really hypocritical when examining the Truman administration, by saying that “America’s leader should have thought”. He’s the one that’s always talking about how statesmen get no credit because they make poor decisions in the heat of the moment when they don’t know all the facts. That really bothered me in this reading.
Other than that, Korea just sounds horrible. I mean, the United States couldn’t lose, because then communism would spread, and they couldn’t have that. But they also didn’t want to win, because then the Soviets would want to fight with the US. I think that was one of those rash decisions that was decided in the heat of the moment, that didn’t get much thought. I mean, obviously it did get some thought, but not as much “what ifs” as were needed. I also think it was really flaky of Truman to keep changing his aims in Korea.
I thought it was interesting how Kissinger describes containment as “working” for three years until North Korea invaded South Korea. While he’s discussing this, he mentions that the Korean War was, for America, more about the “symbolism of permitting communist aggression” (475) than geopolitical aims. He didn’t say it was about containment or the Domino Theory, but symbolism, which I would argue is different. I had never really heard this war talked about that way before. Usually it’s all containment this, containment that.
Kissinger also talks about this “Sino-Soviet” rift. It seems strange to me that Communism was simplified to the degree that the West was so inclined to lump all of Communist policy together even in light of apparent tension between policymakers. Stalin and Mao were not buddies, but they were feared in similar ways and treated similarly. I understand that the fear of Communism in general was very strong in the 1950s, but the “types” of Communism, if you will, that were practised by Moscow and Beijing were so different that it seems strange that they were sometimes seen as interchangeable. The policies of the countries depended almost entirely on the whims of the dictators, who were quite different.
Continuously throughout the chapter, Kissinger refers to the idea of “real peace”, but doesn’t quite address it until mid-way through the reading. He claims that such a goal can only be achieved through taking concrete steps towards insuring that the fighting won’t break out again, stop the fighting, or end the aggression. Although these were the potential aims of the United States, Kissinger made a good point when he quoted the phrase “fight it out in general… without committing too great forces”, which simply reiterated the problem of having a policy that was too cloudy and not specific enough to actually make changes.
I believe that there are various assumptions that Kissenger makes about the US’s lack of restraint. He talks about American faith in her field generals while in battle and how basically no one listened to the seasoned politicians and let them make the decisions. I am inclined to believe Kissenger when he says that lives could have been saved and Korea kept out of communist hands had US troops proceeded past the 38th parallel to conquer all the way up to the “bottleneck of the peninsula”. He says that the position attained would have been easier to defend and hold, thus keeping communism on a line. I think that this Korea section as a whole can be seen as Kissenger’s commentary on the importance of in-the-moment decisions. He justifies his actions on Vietnam by pointing out the blunders in Korea, which is fine, but I believe it clouds his objectivity as a source.