The mam pictured above is George F. Kennan. He is worth a google. His influence, according to Kissinger, through the Long Telegram, and the “Sources of Soviet Conduct” published in “Foreign Affairs” under the pseudonym “X” not only were the foundation of the policy of containment but went so far as to predict what would happen under Gorbachev, namely, the dissolution of the USSR.
There is a lot here in this little chapter. What if Lippman had been more influential? What about Wallace? Was Truman really returning to a style of Realpolitik (Is that why Kissinger likes him so much?) and merely couching the protection in moral codes, or did he really believe he was advancing collective security? Did Acheson really believe NATO was not an alliance aimed at the Soviet Sphere? The Matthews Memorandum is worth noting as is Clark Clifford.
Were the suggestions of Kennan really implemented?
Something that caught my attention was the conversation Acheson had with the chairman (Senator Connally) and the repetitiveness of the conversation. Basically what the chairman wanted to know, if they were sure that the alliance was really an peacetime alliance or a militaristic one. I truly think he does think that this is a peacetime alliance and it was not aimed necessarily toward the Soviet sphere, however, specifically then it was even though everybody was denying. Going back to collective security, it makes sense this way because the countries that are in danger of communism are able to be protected by NATO and contain it.
The way I saw the Matthews memorandum was as something like (an outline) of what the U.S. could do regarding utilizing the containment policy,and later Clifford being the presidential adviser would remove the ambiguities and limitations the memorandum presented.
If Lippmann would have been more influential and gotten approval of the president, then probably the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine (containment policy) would have not occurred and maybe the Soviet Union would have become even more powerful, or maybe not. What Wallace believed I think was true because after WWII and FDR’s negligence to talk about post-war Germany increased tension b/w the U.S. and Soviet Union, thus when the war ended there was a sphere and satellites the Soviet Union controlled, (the Iron Curtain only intensified it even more). Now with the Containment policy, the Soviet Union-U.S. relationship was broken and they were enemies.
I found the Matthews memorandum to be rather interesting in the same vein as the Pact of Paris – on paper, it seems grand and noble, but after many quick edits it was rendered rather useless.
“We will attack the Soviet Union!” cries the United States. “Unless, of course, they are moving by land. Also, if they are moving into countries we care about we honestly feel that Britain could do a better job. Die, Soviet scum!”
Also, there was the fact that the Soviet Union was a part of the United Nations and had the power to veto the memorandum. All in all, this didn’t seem that well thought-out. The Matthews memorandum feels like an (apparently not hugely successful, if Kissinger’s lack of depth means anything) attempt to boost morale and show that America was taking a stand than anything that could actually affect the Soviet Union.
Although it appears that Kissinger liked Kennan better, he does give a great comparison between Kennan and Lippmann, and their effects on American thinking. According to Kissinger, Kennan understood the weakness behind communism, but Lippmann pointed out the faults and potential issues of basing a foreign policy solely on containment. Wallace, on the other hand, seemed to severly distrust Great Britain, and suggested at any opportunity he had that the United States should stay away from creating any lasting relations with the country. In the 1920′s, America decided to practice isolationism on the account of being “too good for the world”, but in accordance with Wallace’s thinking, the US later withdrew because “it was not good enough for the world”.
I thought Clifford played a very important role because he believed thaat the Soviet-American conflicts were not caused by clashing national interests but instead but by moral shortcomings of the Soviet leader. Similar to Wilson when he identified the Kaiser as the cause for declaration of war. Clifford was the first to define Tthe U.S’ security role during the Cold War when he said ” all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endagered by the USSR” would be supported by America. This eventually became NATO.
Mr. Steussy was right there is alot in this chapter. There is quite alot to take in but the part of the chapter that i seemed to understand the best was when Kissinger broke down the policy of cantainment by NATO. Kissinger states that once a country is not in danger of being taken over by a communist force then they could be protacted by the NATO forces
In response to the question of Realpolitik, I think Truman could be practicing a bit of a realpolitik/collective security mix. While the ideals behind the containment policy were done in the interest of bettering mankind and preserving democracy and the will of the people in danger of the USSR, the US had to have the strength to back it up. Of course, the US didn’t always go about this the right way, we put many people in power in countries where we didn’t like the current order; sometimes these people were dictatorial, but we felt justified because it at least wasn’t communism. That’s the Realpolitik practice, that we meddled in countries only to establish governments friendly to us. We did do this, however, thinking that it was best for the people of the countries we meddled in, having seen the harm that a communist regime could cause.