Here’s a good article on Soviet/Afghan stuff;

http://www.e-ir.info/2010/01/03/the-soviet-union%E2%80%99s-last-war/

To Bryce: Yes! Hindsight is real important. It reminds me of Kissinger’s introduction to his book, where he lends understanding to the faults of world leaders by considering they don’t have the benefit of hindsight (or the benefit of unlimited time). Also: it’s interesting you say that about Truman, because in the context of our history class (maybe it’s just Kissinger) he seems to be remembered very fondly—his Doctrine formed the basis of American Cold War diplomacy, and I guess is said by some to have eventually brought the end of the Cold War. Again, maybe it’s just Kissinger who says that, but I feel like I caught hints of that in Bret Stephens’ interview with Obama.

I love that “Democratic Enlargement” was a sort of focus-grouped concept. It seems somewhat appropriate for the 1990s, and for Clinton’s highly economic mindset. Also, I love the McDonald’s stuff at the end (I think I already talked about that in your last post)! I highly highly recommend George Ritzer’s The McDonaldization of Society because it’s a great book and everyone should read it.

I really like Bill Clinton. Maybe it’s because I have vague nostalgia for my preschool years? And I really like Al Gore. Maybe because I have lasting resentments from the Bush years? I don’t know. It’s cool to see the development of globalization and all that. I’m going to bed, goodnight.

Clinton’s attitude toward foreign policy was a bit amusing. He began by ignoring it, then using “band-aid” diplomacy, to finally claiming it had meshed with domestic policy and should fly under the same banner, so to speak. I’ve always kind of had the impression that Clinton wasn’t a particularly good president (not that he was a bad one at all, just that he didn’t have much of a plan or scheme or ideal that set him apart), and that his term was successful due to a myriad of outside reasons and that he facilitated it well. I’m not quite phrasing this right…oh well. Anyway, Clinton certainly seems to me more remembered for his successes than his failures, except perhaps in the case of Monica Lewinski.

So first, let me say that this last reading was bittersweet. It’s exciting to finish, but I have to admit that I’m a little sad to say goodbye to Ambrose and Kissinger. Now what am I going to do with my time? Read novels? Do art or hang out with friends? Play Pokemon? (Answer: probably that last one.)

(Also, I think I skipped ahead because I want to talk about Democratic Enlargement and McDonald’s but we’re not there yet.)

All this talk of “world orders” is really interesting. I love the idea of Kissinger wandering around all despondent at the close of the 20th century, now that the world seems to be devoid of meaning. That’s the impression I get from this final chapter and from Fukuyama’s essay. I mean, maybe it’s cool that the Cold War is “over”? Maybe we can focus on more important stuff? Maybe we can finally pay attention to the “third world” (a Cold War term, if I’m not mistaken, which I think is real indicative of the era’s focus on the superpowers)?

Maybe I’m simply idealistic, but it seems like the end of massive ideological conflict is a good thing. And I mean, it’s not like conflict is gone, it exists in many shape in forms, both domestic and international, military and economic, ideological and material. It just seems strange to lament the death of the balance of powers and spheres of influence; to me such orders seem antiquated in a post-colonialist globalized world. Kissinger’s analysis reads to me a lot like an old man scared and confused by the new world he’s found himself in, so different from the one of his youth.

That’s not to say that Kissinger’s analysis isn’t lucid or intelligent. I also like thinking of it the way Lauren described it to me: as Kissinger detailing his advice for world leaders in getting along in this new world. He puts down some compelling arguments, I think made stronger by the history he details extensively throughout the rest of the book. So, I guess, the real point, is that no one knows how everything is going to turn out, and the destruction of our previous guiding narrative really does make it more difficult to predict possible outcomes for international relations. In Ambrose’s final chapter, we seem to get a taste of a new narrative being formed by Clinton and the forces of globalization. What I hope, I guess, is that we can move this narrative away from competition between superpowers and towards the hard work of making the world a better place to live in for everyone.

“Victory in the Cold War had made it far more difficult to implement the Wilsonian dream of universal collective security.” I thought this quote was interesting, in part because it seemed so counterintuitive. I mean, victory–wiping out the Communist “evil empire”–was not necesarily beneficial for the spread of democracy? I’ll take a leap and say that now that the smaller countries are not united agaist a common enemy, there is less attraction to democracy, as nations don’t have to choose sides: rather than Communist or Democratic, they can maneuver themself somewhere inbetween without fearing being condemned for siding with the USSR and the failed Soviet system.

Anyway, I hardly think this is the end of history. I don’t know what will become of America–we will likely remain among the world powers for some time now due to our current position, but whether we will continue to maintain our position for centuries to come is unforseeable. I doubt anyone, especially Kissinger, would have guessed about the economic crises in Greece and Spain and the EU, given his rather Eurocentric beliefs. I guess we’ll have to see where we’ll end up.

Kissinger also spends the first few pages of the chapter discussing how backward of a nation the Soviet Union was. He notes that it was practically doomed to failure due to its overextension and its leaders, who overestimated its strength and were unable to clearly see what a weak system the current Communist government truely was. In terms of Gorbachev, Kissinger almost painst him as an idealist, in that while Gorby may have truely wanted to improve the Soviet Union, he simply did not understand the true reprications of his actions, and that the USSR was not a structure that easily welcomed big altercations, or rather any changes at all.

One part of the chapter I found to be hilarious was Kissinger’s affrontedness at Reagan’s comparison of Gorbachev and Bismark. I feel like Kissinger almost reveres Bismark, and feels that only he himself has the right to make obscure comparisons to the great leader. I mean, maybe it wasn’t an apt comparison, but Kissinger seems overly perturbed that his favorite statesman could ever be compared to the leader of a collapsing nation. I thought his reaction to the whole thing was rather amusing.

I love the idea that the Cold War was especially appropriate for the United States, as it filled our need for conflict to be clear, ideological, and manichean. It’s so interesting because I feel like, in more recent years (i.e. the last decade), that has kept the US in a Cold War mentality and into a lot of trouble—as Kissinger puts it, “America’s travails—from Suez to Vietnam—resulted from its application of universal principles to specific cases which proved inhospitable to them” (802). So much analysis of the Cold War points it towards being something that the American psyche needs and desires—I saw hints of this in Fukuyama’s article, too. But I wonder: do we need this? Is it harmful? Do we need to “develop some definition of [our] national interest” (803)?

I feel like as the chapters wear on, Ambrose and Brinkly make more and more references to previous events in history. Hussein is Hitler, the Iraq War is Vietnam, Tienanmen Square is Hungary all over again…I guess one could argue that history does repeat itself. Much of the time, though, I certainly feel the comparisons are made more to make an impact rather than being completely accurate. I mean, there are only so many situations that can be another Vietnam, or so many men that can be considered another Hitler…

I thought the most interesting thing about this reading was the importance Ambrose and Brinkley gave to Bush’s comparisons between Hussein and Hitler. He claimed that these were a double-edged sword: it allowed Bush to push Iraq out of Kuwait with every bit of manpower he could, but it also implied that Bush intended to occupy Iraq after the fighting and restore a people-approved government. Ambrose criticizes Bush for this and for not having a clear enough vision for the end of the war. I assume that Ambrose argues the negative implication of the Hitler comparison with some authority–it must have been a popular enough notion at the time. However, it didn’t seem like Bush thought his words had that implication. At the end of the war, he did not feel compelled to assert control over the state of Iraq, nor did he feel compelled to apologise for not doing as many thought he would. Ambrose’s narrative gives me the impression he never even considered it, but I suppose it could have been that he wasn’t going to validate an unofficial declaration that he decided against.